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Negotiating in Anticipation of
Arbitration: Some Guideposts
for the Initiated
Roger I. Abrams*
Participants in the collective bargainingprocess view the successful negotiation of
an agreement as the welcome end to what may have been an unpleasant ordeal
More often than not, however, in order to reach agreement the participants have
based their agreement on vague promises offered in the heat of negotiations. Thus,
the collective agreement may be only the beginning of more problems once later
disputes reveal its inadequacies Professor Abrams observes that collective bargain-
ing is not afnite but a continuing process. In recognition of this, he offers several
guideposts that negotiators should heed to ensure that the agreements they reach are
complete, embody the intent of the parties, and will serve as an adequate reference
for resolvingfuture disputes.
INTRODUCTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING' is not a single event. The
process is "continuous as the stars that shine,"2 although one
might suggest there is many a cloudy night. Collective bargaining
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. B.A. (1967), Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D. (1970), Harvard University.
This comment is based upon an address to the Cleveland Labor Conference on Septem-
ber 22, 1978.
1. The term "collective bargaining" is generally attributed to Beatrice Potter Webb,
who introduced it in 1891. B. POTTER, THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN
216-17 (1891), noted in R. RICHARDSON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY OBJECTIVES 91 n.1
(1977). In a later work Beatrice and Sidney Webb described the metamorphosis of individ-
ual bargaining into collective bargaining:
[I]f a group of workmen concert together, and send representatives to conduct the
bargaining on behalf of the whole body, the position at once changes. Instead of
the employer making a series of separate contracts with isolated individuals, he
meets with a collective will, and settles, in a single agreement, the principles upon
which, for the time being, all workmen of a particular group, or class, or grade,
will be engaged.
S. WEBB & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173 (1902), notedin R. RICHARDSON, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING BY OBJECTIVES 91 n.2 (1977).
2. W. WORDSWORTH, "Daffodils," in 3 WORDSWORTH'S POETICAL WORKS 6 (W.
Knight ed. 1883).
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is a process for bringing order to the workplace. 3 It is the counter-
point to the "free play of economic forces"-the strike.4 The
strike is avoided or ended by using the rituals of the bargaining
table.5 Although the parties call a temporary truce by executing
an agreement, both sides contemplate renewed skirmishes in the
form of grievances during the term of the agreement. In order to
steer these disputes into peaceful channels of resolution, labor and
management have traditionally, and now almost universally,6 cre-
ated mandatory machinery for grievance resolution.
A grievance filed claiming a misapplication of a contract pro-
vision is not an aberration;7 it is a continuation of the collective
bargaining process.' While the negotiators of the agreement may
not have foreseen the particulars of a dispute, they no doubt did
foresee that some disputes would arise. Every contract has room
for interpretation in its application.9
When parties negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, they
are often conscious of precisely what is left unsaid and what is left
ambiguous. Deliberate omissions and ambiguities are often nec-
essary to facilitate agreement. They enable the parties to subjec-
3. There are, of course, other modes of establishing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. For example, unilateral determination by the employer is an alternative mecha-
nism used in free market economies. In the United States the growth of labor unions has
collectivized the economic power of the individual employee, challenging the basic as-
sumptions of the entrepreneurial prerogative and requiring a rethinking of national policy
"to bring some order out of the industrial chaos." Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970). The accommodation reached between the conflicting inter-
ests of organized labor and management sanctioned collective bargaining as the preferred
mechanism for ordering the industrial establishment.
4. But the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national
labor relations policy, the two factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining be-
tween parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to each to make
the other party incline to agree on one's terms-exist side by side.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
5. See generally C. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIA-
TION (1963); R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIA-
TIONS (1965).
6. A survey of major collective bargaining agreements conducted by the Bureau of
National Affairs indicates that 96% of the sample contracts contain arbitration procedures
and 98% contain grievance procedures. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACTS (BNA) 51:1, :6 (1975).
7. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999,
1007 (1955); see Cox, Rights Under 4 Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956).
8. "The grievance [and arbitration] procedure is, in other words, a part of the contin-
uous collective bargaining process." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
9. Shulman, supra note 7, at 1004-05. As a result, interim adjustments in the parties'
relationship--the fine-tuning of the agreement-are made on a case-by-case basis during
the term of the agreement through the use of the grievance and arbitration system.
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tively read the written words of the contract as expressing what
they would like to find in the agreement. The parties are content
to leave for another day the resolution of disputes which may or
may not arise, finding mutual refuge in ambiguity.'" They post-
pone the resolution of minor disputes which undoubtedly will
arise, but over which they are not yet ready to breach the indus-
trial peace.I1 Customary practice contemplates the postponement
of much dispute resolution, but this strategy does not mean that
the parties should bargain without full consciousness that what
they do now in drafting their agreement will control how those
later arising disputes will be resolved in arbitration. Recognition
of collective bargaining as a continuing process mandates that the
parties negotiate their agreement in anticipation of arbitration.
Collective bargaining is a purposive endeavor, designed to re-
adjust the objective evidence of the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. Around the bargaining table, parties deal with
problems that arose under the expiring contract and reset their
bargain of compensation for work performed. 2 But the parties
should also view the process as facilitating the resolution of future
disputes by the parties' appointed arbitrator. Thus, the process
itself is retrospective since it addresses prior problems, concurrent
since it sets the employment bargain, and prospective since it pro-
vides guidance for the resolution of future disputes. Of course, the
deal struck across the bargaining table should certainly reflect
each side's best attempt to reach a settlement of present issues,
accommodating their then current disparate interests. Substan-
tively, each side should strive to obtain the best deal with which it
can live. But each party should be aware that the final prod-
uct-the collective bargaining agreement-has future, and not
merely current, impact on dispute resolution.' 3
It is the purpose of this comment to set forth guideposts for
10. Id at 1004.
11. Id
12. The compensation bargain comes in various forms. Wages and salary have in-
creasingly been supplemented by fringe benefits of various kinds, including life and medi-
cal insurance, dental plans, disability insurance, pensions, severance pay, supplemental
unemployment benefits, and legal services plans. For general theories of wage determina-
tion by collective negotiation, see E. BuRTT, JR., LABOR MARKETS, UNIONS, AND GOVERN-
MENT POLICIES (1963); J. CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING (1969); J. DUNLOP,
WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER TRADE UNIONS (1950).
13. In bargaining a compensation package, both sides, of course, focus on the future,
as well as the current, economic costs imposed by the collective agreement. Viewing arbi-
tration as "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960), means that the costs involved
430 Vol. 29:428
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both union and management representatives to be followed at the
bargaining table to insure that an arbitrator resolves their future
disputes consistent with their intentions and expectations. 4 The
experienced bargainer will find little that is startling in these
guideposts. They do, however, integrate collective bargaining and
arbitration and focus on each as part of a single, continuing proc-
ess.
In general, negotiating in anticipation of arbitration is just
good bargaining. Parties who do bargain in anticipation of arbi-
tration will strive for clarity in their draftsmanship; they will deal
with foreseeable disputes; they will complete their agreement by
including all the necessary prerequisites to its administration.
They will define certain terms to specify their intentions. They
will recognize the implications of bargaining over what might be
termed "clauses without boundaries." Finally, they will delineate
the scope of the arbitrator's power and establish procedures for its
use.'5 By following these guideposts, parties can control their own
creation-the arbitration tribunal-so that decisions reached by
arbitrators are consistent with how the parties would have decided
a dispute had they been forced to come to a final and binding
resolution themselves. 16
at the bargaining table are not limited merely to deferred compensation but also include
the risk of unfavorable arbitral outcomes in future disputes.
It is impossible to know how much attention the parties actually give to the impact of
their written bargain on the arbitration process. Undoubtedly, a significant prior arbitra-
tion decision which did not meet the legitimate expectations of one of the parties would
encourage reformation of the relevant collective bargaining provisions at the next round of
negotiations. On the whole, however, even an experienced negotiator is compelled by the
dynamics of bargaining to seek a present accommodation without focusing on the im-
ponderables of future disputes.
14. The process of labor arbitration discussed here is often referred to as grievance or
rights arbitration, as distinguished from the comparatively little-used process of interest
arbitration. The former involves an adjudicative process for resolving disputes which arise
under a collective agreement, R. GORMAN, BAsic TExT ON LABOR LAW 388-90 (1976),
while the latter involves a legislative process whereby the arbitrator determines what shall
be the terms or conditions of employment for the parties. Id at 573-74. Bargaining in
anticipation of the interest arbitration has been ably discussed elsewhere. See J. STERN, C.
REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER, & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION (1975).
15. Bargaining strategy and tactics are outside the scope of this comment, but there
are many useful sources in the area. Eg., C. KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE: THE COMPLETE
GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND TACTICs (1974); B. MORSE, How TO NEGOTI-
ATE THE LABOR AGREEMENT (1966); E. PETERS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABOR NE-
GOTIATIONS (1955).
16. An arbitrator's interpretation of the parties' agreement will in most instances con-
stitute a final and binding resolution of a disputed matter. Except in the most unusual
cases, however, the language agreed to by the parties will not have contemplated the pre-
cise factual setting of a particular dispute. The arbitrator's resolution of the matter may
1979]
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I. GUIDEPOSTS FOR NEGOTIATING IN ANTICIPATION OF
ARBITRATION
A. Clarity in Draftsmanshio
Defective draftsmanship hinders the arbitrator's decisionmak-
ing and creates significant uncertainties for the parties. Any
number of situations cause poor draftsmanship. The parties may
have known with certainty what they agreed to when they drafted
the clause, but they may have expressed it in language that sug-
gests other reasonable interpretations. They may have used words
which made sense at 2 o'clock in the morning but at sunrise would
challenge the language of the Jabberwocky. 7 A provision may be
the product of a series of negotiations over many years. Tacking
on a final sentence may have been easier than rewriting a com-
plete provision, but it may present a substantive thought that is
inconsistent with the rest of the provision.'8 The parties may have
attached an entirely new clause to a contract with other clauses
speaking to the same, similar, or related issues.19
Arbitral jurisprudence does provide generally accepted rules
of construction to deal with these problems.2 ° One example is the
therefore be seen as his attempt to determine, based on the evidence the parties present to
him, how they would have decided the dispute.
A useful model of the arbitrator as "contract reader" was recently presented by Dean
Theodore St. Antoine. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977). He suggests that
the arbitrator sits as a "joint alter ego" to strike a supplemental bargain between the par-
ties. To serve in this role, the arbitrator must resolve a dispute as he determines the parties
would have resolved it.
17. Arbitrator Harry Platt in Evening News Ass'n v. Detroit Paper Handlers and Plate
Handlers Union No. 10, 50 Lab. Arb. 239 (1968), was faced with the task of interpreting a
contract provision which he characterized as "hardly a model of clarity." Id at 245.
Not infrequently, words or phrases are unthinkingly included which, if construed
according to their literal meaning would produce results in opposition to the main
purpose and object of a provision .... In such a case, there can be no doubt as to
the right of an interpreter to modify and mitigate-in effect excise-the unpre-
meditated, unintended language in order to prevent an absurd result and to give
effect to the true intention of the parties.
Id
18. See, e.g., Rangaire, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 382, 66
Lab. Arb. 755 (1976) (Woodward, Arb.).
19. For example, a clause on seniority may make that criterion applicable to the
scheduling of vacations, while a later-negotiated clause on vacations may specify that the
employer will consider the interests and desires of employees in arranging their vacation
schedules. Although there is no irreconcilable conffict between the two provisions--the
employer might schedule in accordance with employee desires as long as seniority is
equal-the parties have not fit the contractual puzzle pieces together. Instead, they have
merely laid them out for arrangement by the arbitrator.
20. F. ELKOJRI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 298 (3d ed. 1973).
[Vol. 29:428
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rule which provides that the clause or provision last negotiated
takes precedence.2' Yet an arbitrator relying on that rule may not
be recognizing the parties' intention. Moreover, applying one pro-
vision over another in resolving a dispute violates the rule of con-
struction that the arbitrator must read the agreement as a whole.
22
Rules of construction are rarely, if ever, written into collective
agreements. The arbitrator's use of rules of construction adds a
gloss to the parties' contract upon which they undoubtedly did not
focus. While use of such rules is intended to repair the faulty ex-
pressions of the parties' bargain, reliance on these rules is a poor
substitute for clarity in draftsmanship.
Parties should strive in their negotiations to set forth clearly
and simply their substantive agreement. 3 This guidepost is easy
to posit but much more difficult to follow. First, crystal-clear lan-
guage may be unacceptable to a party who wishes to leave an is-
sue unresolved. When the bargain is set out with particularity,
each side knows what it has gained and what it has lost. Although
each side may be willing to discuss a subject and even include
some vague compromise in the agreement, an unequivocal state-
ment concerning that subject may be unacceptable. 24 Second, the
pressure of an imminent or present strike may make perfect ex-
pression a worthy but unattainable goal. Finally, the parties may
lack the skill and experience to clarify their expression.
21. Consider also a clause specifically addressing the disputed issue and a clause more
generally applicable. In such a case, another handy maxim of contract interpretation-the
specific governs over the general-will be applied by the arbitrator. Id at 311.
22. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 20, at 307-08. The great weakness in
any notion of generally accepted rules of construction of contract language is the propen-
sity for conflict between rules, or the existence of rules, which diametrically oppose one
another. As the late Lon Fuller pointed out:
[Tihese principles tend to come in off-setting pairs. One can find a maxim accord-
ing to which when you say "trees" you must mean shrubs also, shrubs being so
much like trees. By another maxim one can argue that when you say "trees" you
must mean to exclude shrubs because if you have meant shrubs you would have
said so; shrubs being so much like trees, and so naturally suggested by them you
couldn't have forgotten about them when you said "trees" and stopped.
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rav. 3, 6.
23. The draftmanship guidepost is particularly appropriate for anticipating what are
called "contract interpretation" cases. Discharge and discipline cases generally involve
only the contract requirement that the employer's action be based upon "just cause." Such
a requirement is difficult, though not impossible, to draft poorly.
24. Of course, even a general discussion of the issue in the agreement may be unac-
ceptable. Under §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, parties
must bargain in good faith over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, .. but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 158(d) (1976); see R.
GORMAN, supra note 14, at 399-495.
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Bargaining in anticipation of arbitration does not mean that
vague, generalized language must be avoided at all costs. To the
contrary, such language may be essential to accommodate con-
flicting interests. What the guidepost of simple, clear language
does suggest is that where the parties have in fact reached a pre-
cise agreement, they should strive to word their settlement clearly
enough to express their agreement and avoid misinterpretation.2 5
When the parties use ambiguous language to settle a contract,
they should use it as a matter of conscious choice. Employing
generalized language to postpone disputes is appropriate so long
as the parties recognize that imprecision generates grievances and
leaves to the arbitrator the ultimate power to divine what the par-
ties intended by their imperfect statement. If parties consciously
obfuscate and avoid precision in their agreement, the arbitrator's
later interpretation is, at best, an educated guess as to the parties'
intent.2 6 Consider, for example, a most helpful word used in
resolving negotiation problems--"reasonable"-as in "the Com-
pany will make reasonable efforts to ... ." Parties employ the
word to deal with allocating overtime,27 scheduling vacations,28 or
avoiding subcontracting.29 They use the word to characterize
those rules which management may promulgate. 30 But in invok-
ing this magical incantation of reasonableness the parties are be-
stowing upon the arbitrator the authority to determine what the
parties meant when they said reasonable.3' The immediate costs
25. The techniques of clear, precise draftsmanship are ably discussed in L. MARCEAU,
DRAFTING A UNION CONTRACT (1965).
26. Although a cost-benefit analysis could prove helpful in deciding whether to use
ambiguous language to settle the agreement, such an analysis would be difficult to carry
out. Management can calculate the cost of a strike in terms of lost production, good will,
and the like, while the union can estimate the cost in terms of lost employee wages. But it
may be impossible to determine the likelihood of a breakdown in negotiations over a par-
ticular matter, except perhaps on compensation issues. And even then, it is difficult to
predict whether a dispute will arise over a particular matter during the term of the agree-
ment and, if one does, whether it will be resolved privately through the grievance proce-
dure before arbitration. After that, the imponderables of the arbitration process itself must
be factored into the analysis. One must admit that, while the risk of using ambiguous
provisions is there, its dimensions are uncertain.
27. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. International Chem. Workers Local 692, 70-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards [ 8504 (1970) (Uible, Arb.).
28. See, e.g., Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. International Union of United Brewery Work-
ers Local 130, 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 8674 (1964) (Singletary, Arb.).
29. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. USW Local 5503, 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 8654
(1964) (Scheiber, Arb.).
30. See, e.g., Mobil Chem. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 308, 70-2
Lab. Arb. Awards 8578 (1970) (Williams, Arb.).
31. The arbitrator naturally will look to the prior practice of the parties to delineate
[Vol. 29:428
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of failing to reach agreement absent the use of the magic word
"reasonable" are clear, the future costs in terms of an arbitrator's
decision are uncertain. The tradeoff may be patently efficient, but
there is a tradeoff.
On the other hand, there is no excuse for imprecise language
in a situation where the parties have in fact reached a definite
agreement. Take as an example the work requirements in a typi-
cal paid holiday clause." The parties have included in their
agreement the following old chestnut:
An employee will not be paid for the holiday if he does not
work the day before or the day after the holiday.
This is an attempt to create a work eligibility requirement for a
paid holiday.3 The requirement is generally used to penalize an
employee for stretching a holiday into a minivacation and to in-
sure that a full complement of employees are at work on the days
surrounding the holidays. But did the parties write into the con-
tract the requirement they thought they had agreed to? For exam-
ple, in 1978 the Fourth of July fell on a Tuesday. What happens if
an employee works on the day before the holiday, Monday, July
3, but not on the day after, Wednesday, July 5? Does he get the
holiday pay? One reading of the clause is that the employee will
receive holiday pay if he works either the day before or the day
after the holiday. The more probable interpretation, in light of
the customary usage of eligibility requirements, is that he must
work both days in order to qualify. Yet it is possible that the par-
ties intended to prune the minivacation without eliminating the
practice altogether. Such an intention would support the alterna-
tive reading that as long as one of the days was worked, the em-
ployee would qualify for the holiday pay.
The guidepost for clarity in draftsmanship offers a simple solu-
tion. Assuming that the parties intended the customary two-day
the scope of "reasonableness." See generally Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administra-
tion of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1017 (1961). That practice,
however, may not be clear. A recent addition of the term "reasonable" to the collective
bargaining agreement may mean that the parties sought to alter the prior practice. In any
case, the use of the term is not cost free.
32. A holiday clause typically specifies what days are to be considered holidays. In
addition, the holiday clause generally addresses two separate issues: (1) payment for the
holiday which is not worked and (2) premium pay for work done on the holiday. The
holiday pay puzzle is discussed in a fascinating chapter on the semantics of contract lan-
guage in P. PRAsAw & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS 44-59 (1970).
33. Work eligibility requirements are found in 80% of holiday pay provisions. 2 COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 58:6 (1974).
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pre- and post-holiday work requirement, they should have simply
provided:
An employee will not be paid for the holiday unless he works
both the day before and the day after the holiday.
Not all defects in draftsmanship are so easily avoided, but with
some care the parties can minimize unintended ambiguities.
When the parties purposely agree to ambiguous language, they
may be postponing strife now at the risk of a dispute later. The
price paid may certainly be worth it. A dispute may never arise,
or it may be resolved quickly in the grievance procedure. But us-
ing ambiguous language is not cost free. The parties should con-
sciously appreciate the risk and not assume it inadvertently.
When they reach a precise agreement, as they did in the holiday
pay scenario, they should describe their bargain with care and
clarity. When there is consensus, there is no reason to risk misin-
terpretation in arbitration.34
B. Incorporate Defnitions
Another guidepost for attaining clarity in the provisions of the
agreement is the use of definitions of particular terms in the con-
tract.35 The very process of attempting to define terms will
sharpen the focus of negotiating. Disagreement about the mean-
ing of key terms may surface when it would otherwise lie dormant
until unearthed by the arbitrator many months or years later. 6
Consider the definitions included in a recent collective bar-
gaining agreement between the Painesville, Ohio Board of Educa-
tion and the Painesville Education Association. 37  Article I,
34. In the holiday pay scenario, management would be needlessly accepting the risk
of ambiguous draftsmanship, assuming the parties had intended to create the pre- and
post-holiday work requirement. On the other hand, if the parties had sought merely to
minimize the stretching of holidays, the union would be assuming the risk, especially in
light of the customary industrial usage of pre- and post-holiday work requirements.
35. For suggestions in drafting definitional clauses, see L. MARCEAU, supra note 25, at
235-46.
36. The negotiation process involves certain rules or rituals--traditional behavior pat-
terns that foreordain the creation of a written product which will generate later disputes.
See C. STEVENS, supra note 5; R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 5. The dialectic of
proposals and counterproposals followed by language revisions accommodating conflict-
ing positions reflects the bargaining table's natural atmosphere of compromise. Shulman,
supra note 7, at 1004. Modifying those behavior patterns by, for example, adding a draft-
ing rule favoring definitional clauses where appropriate may assist the parties in illuminat-
ing what may otherwise be a shadowy statement of their mutual intentions.
37. These references are to the collective bargaining agreement that expired on Sep-
tember 1, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Painesville Contract]. Following expiration of the con-
tract, negotiations between the parties reached impasse, precipitating a five-week strike.
436 [Vol. 29:428
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Negotiation Procedure, defines what the parties mean by good
faith bargaining 38 -a conundrum that has puzzled the commenta-
tors, the Labor Board, and the courts for over forty years.3 9 Arti-
cle II, Grievance Procedure, includes six definitions. The most
helpful one defines what counts as a day for grievance step time
limits,4" an unending source of problems for arbitrators ruling on
procedural arbitrability.4 I Article IV, Teaching Days and Hours,
defines workday and distinguishes it from school day by sepa-
rately defining the latter term.42 Article VI, Transfer and Vaca-
tions, defines transfer for the purposes of that article. 3 Article IX,
Fringe Benefits, expressly defines retire for purposes of severance
pay.44 Article X, Absences and Leaves, defines meetings for pro-
The strike, which was unlawful under Ohio's Ferguson Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1973), ended on November 3, 1978, when the teachers, under court
order, voted to return to work. At this writing, a new collective bargaining agreement has
not been executed. For a comprehensive discussion ofnegotiations in the public sector, see
M. MOSKOW, J. LOEWENBERG & E. KOZIARA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EM-
PLOYMENT (1970).
38. "Good Faith" means coming to the negotiating table with the intention of
negotiating, not of dogmatically pursuing preconceived stands. Good faith re-
quires that the Association and the Board be willing to react to each others [sic]
proposals. If a proposal is unacceptable to one of the parties that party is obliged
to give its reasons. Good faith requires both parties to recognize negotiations as a
shared process. The obligation of the Board or its representatives and the Associ-
ation or its representatives does not require either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.
Painesville Contract, supra note 37, Art. I, § 4.2(e).
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Cox, The Du y
to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Fleming, The Obligation to Bar-
gain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961); Gross, Cullen, & Hanslowe, Good Faith in
Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (1968); Smith, The
Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065
(1941).
40. "'Days' shall mean actual working school days unless specified differently."
Painesville Contract, supra note 37, Art. II, Pt. A, § 6.
41. See, e.g., E. C. Jones, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machs. and Aerospace Work-
ers Local 1471, 53 Lab. Arb. 1100 (1969) (Bell, Arb.).
42. "'Workday' means the time a teacher is required to be in the building. School
day is the times students are required to be in the building." Painesville Contract, supra
note 37, Art. IV, Pt. A.
43. "For purposes of this article, 'transfer' means reassigning a teacher to a different
department, grade, or building." Id Art. VI, Pt. E.
44. For purposes of this section, an employee shall be deemed to 'retire' if: (1)
the employee becomes eligible for receipt of benefits from the State Teacher's
Retirement System at the time the employee terminates employment with the
Painesville Township Schools, or (2) the employee leaves the teaching profession
when his or her employment with the Painesville Township Schools terminates,
has ten years of service and is fifty-five years of age or older.
Id Art. IX, Pt. D, §§ 1-2.
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fessional in-service training.45 This unusual elaboration of defini-
tions, while not obviating all contract interpretation disputes
during the term of the agreement,46 certainly minimizes the
hazards of ambiguity.
Consider another example. A machine breaks down, and the
four persons who work the machine and who have high seniority
are sent home, missing a number of hours of work as a result. The
collective agreement provides that layoffs shall be by seniority. Is
this a layoff? Should seniority have been followed?47 If the par-
ties have defined the term "layoff" in their contract, or more par-
ticularly defined a layoff where seniority must be followed, the
definition will guide the arbitrator to a result that is consistent
with the parties' expressed intention. The broad statement that
layoffs shall be by seniority delegates to the arbitrator the power
45. "Meetings that are for the expressed purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the
teacher (employee) within the realm of his/her field of contractual responsibility as evi-
denced by the submission of a program of subject content of the meeting to be attended."
Id Art. X, Pt. E.
46. During the term of the Painesville agreement a dispute arose concerning the tim-
ing of payment to teachers during December. Painesville Township Bd. of Educ. v. Paines-
ville Township Educ. Ass'n, 78-2 LAB. ARB. AWARDS (CCH) [ 8366 (1978) (Abrams,
Arb.). The Education Association contended that the second December payment had to be
made on the last workday in December before the Christmas recess (December 21, 1977),
and that, therefore, the Board of Education violated the agreement by dating the checks,
distributed before the recess, December 30. The Board of Education relied on the "plain
and clear" language of Article VIII, Section B: "[T]eachers shall be paid on a semimonthly
. . . basis with the fifteenth day and the thirtieth day of each month designated as payment
dates--except when the day falls on a week-end or holiday in which case payment will be
made on the last workday preceding such .. " Since December 30, the contractually
designated payment date, was not a holiday and did not fall on a weekend, payment was
appropriately made on that date.
This writer was appointed to arbitrate the dispute. In resolving the dispute, the parties'
expertise in defining terms throughout the agreement was most relevant:
The Association and the Board, although bargaining their first comprehensive
agreement, obviously used care and skill in their draftsmanship. Throughout the
Agreement terms are defined, rights and duties are specified with preciseness and
procedures are delineated. In selecting the term "holiday," the parties have em-
ployed a word with an ordinary, natural and definite meaning. It is that meaning
which controls the outcome of this case.
Id at 4738. Thus, in the absence of supportive past practice or bargaining history, the
grievance was denied. It may seem ironic that a party's expertise in draftsmanship can
return to haunt that party in arbitration, but the definitional provisions in the contract
undoubtedly benefited both parties in administering the agreement throughout its term.
47. Compare Corhart Refractories Co. v. United Brick and Clay Workers Local 782,
47 Lab. Arb. 645 (1966) (McCoy, Arb.) with American Metal Prods. Co. v. UAW Local
1198, 22 Lab. Arb. 181 (1954) (Marshall, Arb.). While the hypothetical in the text involves
exposure to the company of only a few dollars, the effect of seniority applicability on man-
agerial decisionmaking can be extensive. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH,
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960).
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to decide whether this interruption of work was a layoff requiring
use of the seniority criterion. Even if the parties cannot agree dur-
ing negotiations on the definition of a layoff, by focusing on the
meaning of the term in the context of various fact situations when
employees lose work time, they have given some guidance for res-
olution of the later dispute through the arbitrator's use of their
bargaining history.48
While most collective agreements do give the arbitrator a point
of reference for interpreting terms, the adoption of definitions can
facilitate his decisionmaking process. 49 The use of definitions
maximizes the probability that the document will be easily read
and applied by the arbitrator.5
C. Dealing With the Foreseeable
It is rare indeed that a dispute arises in the industrial arena
which has not arisen in some form, at some time, somewhere else.
All disputes are, given optimal prevision, foreseeable. Some dis-
putes are more likely to occur than others, but a person trained in
industrial relations can predict with some degree of accuracy the
likelihood of a dispute of a certain nature arising during the term
of an agreement.:" The parties should negotiate in anticipation of
48. See, e.g., Warner & Swazey Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 438, 440 (1966) (Teple, Arb.).
49. Even where the parties have included definitional provisions, an arbitrator must
guard against what Lon Fuller termed "inept literaness" in applying the contract defini-
tions. Fuller tells the story of
the innocent who asked why a player was permitted to continue in the baseball
game after an umpire had told him he was out .... He simply did not under-
stand the game.
Labor relations have today become a highly complicated and technical field.
This field involves complex procedures that vary from industry to industry, from
plant to pIant, from department to department. It has developed its own vocabu-
lary. Though the terms of this vocabulary often seem simple and familiar, their
true meaning can be understood only when they are seen as parts of a larger
system of practice, just as the umpire's "You're out!" can only be fully understood
by one who knows the objectives, the rules and the practices of baseball.
Fuller, supra note 22, at 11.
50. Other such rules for the negotiation process are discussed in R. WALTON & R.
McK RsI, supra note 5. Negotiators should not overlook ministerial conventions of con-
tract drafting, such as adding a table of contents and an index. Lawyers who serve as
negotiators should also resist the regrettable tendency to use legal jargon in drafting the
document since, in large measure, it will be administered by nonlawyers. Achieving clarity
in exposition does not require importing legal phrases and syntax into the industrial com-
pact.
51. Dean Schulman's caveat is worth emphasizing, however: "No matter how much
time is allowed for the negotiation, there is never time enough to think every issue through
in all its possible applications, and never ingenuity enough to anticipate all that does later
show up." Schulman, supra note 7, at 1004.
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arbitration and should actively consider in formulating their pro-
posals those issues which probably will arise during the term of
the agreement.
Subcontracting provides a perfect example of a foreseeable
dispute.12 A company that is part of an industry where subcon-
tracting is common will foreseeably contract out during the term
of an agreement. Before a union raises the subcontracting issue at
the bargaining table, it should consider the various aspects of the
issue and the possible techniques for limiting management's pre-
rogative. Should prior notice of subcontracting be given to the
union?53 Must the company use its present employees to do the
work if they can?5 4 What types of subcontracting are covered by
the clause? What considerations should motivate a decision to
subcontract?55 Should there be any exceptions for emergencies?56
Something less than a comprehensive proposal may be advisa-
ble, however. The union may choose not to address the matter at
52. Subcontracting clauses are quite common in collective bargaining agreements.
The Bureau of National Affairs survey of major collective bargaining agreements reports
that 44% of the sample contracts mention subcontracting. While only 2% of these contracts
prohibit all contracting out of bargaining-unit work to independent contractors, most pro-
vide for some form of limitation on its use by management. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 65:2 (1978).
53. It is understood by both parties that for the Company to satisfy the demands
of its customers and to successfully operate the business, contracting and/or sub-
contracting of work is necessary from time to time.
The Company agrees to give the Union reasonable advance notification of
work it contracts out.
Contract between National Cash Register Co. and International Association of Machinists,
quotedin id at 65:181-82 (1975).
54. "The Union agrees that the Company may, within its exclusive discretion, engage
contractors for all construction operations, including installation, replacement and recon-
struction of plant, equipment, and productive facilities. The Company will endeavor to
utilize its own employees in such situations when practical." Id
55. The Company agrees that it will not subcontract work customarily performed
by the Company in its own plants and with employees in the bargaining unit
unless it is more economical to do so due to inadequate facilities and equipment
or lack of materials and skills necessary to meet competition, or unless such work
cannot be performed by the Company as expeditiously as required in order to
meet customer delivery demands.
Contract between Capitol Manufacturing Co. and International Association of Machinists,
quoted in id at 65:182.
56. Before an outside contractor is brought into the plant, the designated Union
representative will be given as much advance notice as possible in writing but in
any event at least twenty-four (24) hours before the start of any work. . . . In an
emergency, a Union Committeeman or Steward will be notified orally before the
outside contractor starts to work and such oral notice will be followed by notice in
writing.
Contract between Dana Corp. and United Auto Workers, quoted in id at 65:184.
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the bargaining table, thereby allowing an arbitrator to resolve a
dispute over subcontracting which might never arise.57 A con-
scious decision by a negotiator not to discuss a matter is certainly
appropriate. What the guidepost of dealing with foreseeable dis-
putes at the bargaining table does suggest is that, in deciding not
to confront and resolve the various facets of an issue such as sub-
contracting, another tradeoff is made. At the very least, the deci-
sion whether to raise and resolve an issue must be based not only
on how its addition to the bargaining agenda will affect the proc-
ess of negotiation but also on how the absence or presence of a full
contract clause will affect the continuation of the bargaining proc-
ess in the forum of arbitration.
5 8
A union, reviewing the list of subissues involved in subcon-
tracting and concerned about the prospect of losing unit jobs
through subcontracting, would be wise to consider embodying a
limitation on subcontracting in its agreement with management.
In the absence of a contractual restriction, it is unlikely that an
arbitrator will censure limited subcontracting that is motivated by
business considerations.5 9 If a union is to restrict subcontracting,
it must do so expressly through the negotiation process.60 Prior to
bargaining it must consider trends in the industry, prior practices
of the employer, and the potential attractiveness to the employer
57. A union decision not to confront the subcontracting issue in negotiations may pre-
ordain a future union loss in an arbitration concerning this issue. See note 59 infra and
accompanying text. On the other hand, if the union proposes restrictions on management's
prerogative to subcontract and fails to obtain a contract provision containing such a limita-
tion, an arbitrator might rely on the failed attempt as evidence that the parties agreed that
no restrictions be imposed on subcontracting. Such reliance on an unadopted proposal is
inappropriate. As Arbitrator Russell A. Smith said in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. UAW
Local 248, 39 Lab. Arb. 1213 (1962): "[I]t would be unrealistic to interpret futile bargain-
ing efforts as meaning the parties were in agreement that the Agreement implies no restric-
tion at all. Parties frequently try to solidify through bargaining a position which they could
otherwise take, or to broaden rights which otherwise might arguably exist." Id at 1218. In
the same decision, Smith sanctions management subcontracting taken in "good faith" in
the absence of contractual restriction. Id at 1219-20.
58. Management has traditionally been weak in preparing for negotiations, content to
rely on its ability to say no to union proposals. Negotiating in anticipation of arbitration,
however, counsels an active preparation of counterproposals, together with the marshalling
of statistical and other support for management's bargaining stance. See, e.g., M. RYDER,
C. REHMUS, & S. COHEN, MANAGEMENT PREPARATION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1966). In the subcontracting situation, management should be prepared with counterpro-
posals addressing any possible language the union might proffer.
59. See, e.g., Shenango Valley Water Co. v. Utility Workers Local 285, 53 Lab. Arb.
741, 744-45 (1969) (McDermott, Arb.).
60. If the union wants to participate in the decision to subcontract, it must affirma-
tively seek that right in negotiations. The arbitrator will not construct a union right to
participate out of whole cloth.
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of contracting out. If the union concludes that subcontracting is
foreseeable and will have a detrimental impact on the unit, it must
address the issue at the bargaining table.6 The union cannot le-
gitimately anticipate that the arbitrator, in a subsequent subcon-
tracting dispute, will rescue the union from its failure to deal with
the matter in negotiations.
Consider again the holiday pay issue. It is clearly foreseeable
that in administering a holiday provision a series of problems may
arise. Assume that the contract simply lists those days which are
to be observed as holidays and provides for pay equivalent to reg-
ular workday earnings. Is holiday pay due the employee who is
on vacation the week of a holiday? What if the employee is on a
regular day off ? Is pay due if the holiday falls on a weekend? Of
course, the arbitrator faced with any of the above scenarios is
equipped with a bag of arbitral tricks. For instance, where the
contract is silent on these matters and prior practice is not help-
ful,6 2 an arbitrator's source for reconstructing the parties' intent is
the accepted conception of the purpose of a holiday provision.
Generally, paid holidays are considered a fringe benefit and part
of the compensation package.63 Since arbitrators usually apply a
presumption against forfeiture of a benefit, 64 an employee should
be entitled to holiday pay when the holiday falls during a vaca-
tion, on a regular day off, or on a weekend. There is, however, a
contrary-and perhaps outdated-concept of holiday pay as
preventing a loss in weekly take-home pay whenever management
decides to close its business for the holiday. 65 Under this con-
struction, and in the absence of a contrary practice, the employee
would not get holiday pay when the event falls during a vacation,
on his day off, or on a weekend. His paycheck would remain
level.
Have the parties agreed which purpose their holiday pay pro-
vision serves? Of course not. Parties rarely agree on philosophies;
61. See generally W. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GOALS (1973).
62. It must be acknowledged that past practice is generally helpful in resolving these
types of disputes. Contracts have long contained holiday provisions, and it is unlikely that
a particular dispute of this nature will be arising for the first time. But under a first con-
tract between the parties or where the past practice is not clearly established, the arbitrator
may be left unguided by the parties.
63. See Bradlees Family Circle Stores v. International Jewelry Workers Local 225,
66-3 Lab. Arb. Awards [ 8890, at 6092 (1966) (House, Arb.).
64. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 20, at 312.
65. Quaker Oats Co. v. International Chem. Workers Local 397, 65-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards 8367, at 4343 (1965) (Tatum, Arb.).
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they only agree on words used in their industrial context.66 The
arbitrator's use of one formula or the other will be necessary to
resolve the dispute. He probably will grant the pay under an an-
tiforfeiture-of-benefit theory. But he has the prerogative to come
out the other way if the parties have failed to deal with that issue.
When faced with contract language on point, however, the arbi-
trator's duty is to read and apply the provision.67
The constraints of the negotiation process-particularly the
costs of disagreement-obviously make dealing with foreseeable
disputes but one of a number of important bargaining goals. In
the final analysis, the success of the parties in dealing with the
foreseeable is limited by the human constraints on the process of
the private ordering of an industrial relationship.68 Even the most
comprehensive of collective agreements contains ample room for
interpretation by an arbitrator. As is true in much of industrial
life, the need to accommodate pervades the atmosphere of the ne-
gotiations. Necessarily, much must be left to future resolution in
66. The industrial context is, of course, of paramount importance. "Words are not
pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the
meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from
the setting in which they are used. ... NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d
Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.).
67. This is not to suggest that when arbitrators are left to their own devices, they do a
poor job. Most arbitrators skillfully reach a resolution that meets the legitimate expecta-
tions of the parties. Restricting the scope of the arbitrator's decisionmaking power by in-
cluding a precise standard in the agreement merely ensures that the outcome in arbitration
is the paries' outcome and not the independent decision of the neutral third party.
68. Marceau lists seven traits of the ideal contract drafter:
I. Ability to absorb facts. Every drafting assignment requires the rapid acquisi-
tion of new information.
2. A- passion for exactness. The draftsman must be what less precise people
would disparagingly call a mouse tracker, willing to spend hours on the place-
ment of a punctuation mark.
3. Ability to systematize. He can arrange a miscellany of separate rules into a
consistent and logical structure.
4. Ability to put himself in the position of the reader.
5. Inventiveness. He is able to suggest ndw approaches, or new names for old
approaches.
6. Energy. Any lethargy or indolence is fatal.
7. Persistence. He makes his point again and again to one person after an-
other ....
Marceau admits that "no one is born with all these qualities." If such a person existed, he
would be a "curious, energetic, brilliant and opinionated introvert," L. MARCEAU, supra
note 25, at 3.
Moreover, exploring every corner of every issue lest silence ring loudly in arbitration is
an academic pipe dream. For example, there are numerous other holiday pay issues that
the parties have not addressed, such as inclusion of customary overtime pay in the holiday
pay amount, management's right to schedule work on a holiday, and service requirements
for holiday pay eligibility.
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the grievance and arbitration machinery. The objective of the
guidepost of dealing with the foreseeable is to suggest that a part
of the bargaining function is to appreciate those situations where
the written product of the parties' negotiations may be applied. It
is difficult to contemplate experienced bargainers doing otherwise.
D. Finish the Agreement
As a corollary to dealing with foreseeable problems, the parties
should, at the very least, finish what they have started. For exam-
ple, a cost of living allowance provision which does not indicate
what adjustment in the wage rate results from what point change
in which price index is not finished. An incomplete cost of living
provision is troubling. Prior practice may be nonexistent if the
parties have only recently added the benefit to the agreement.
When faced with an incomplete cost of living clause, the arbitra-
tor may just throw up his hands and conclude that he cannot in-
terpret and apply the provision.
Consider the problem Arbitrator Arthur Ross faced in the Cal-
ifornia Tile Contractors Case in 1955.69 He was asked to decide
how the wage adjustment formula included in the agreement
should be applied. He found no clear indication of the base point
from which changes in the cost of living were to be computed, no
definition of the relationship between the amount of the wage ad-
justment and the degree of change in the Consumer Price Index,
and no clarity as to the timing of any adjustment. The clause was,
in his words, "a model of ambiguity"7 and could not be applied.7'
The negotiated wage adjustment formula was, in fact, a classic
example of an agreement that was not finished.
E. Caution: Clauses Without Boundaries
There are a variety of clauses in a typical collective bargaining
agreement which can be characterized as explosive. They are
"clauses without boundaries," clauses which may generate numer-
ous disputes without giving specific guidance to an arbitrator try-
ing to resolve them. An example of such a provision is a past
practices clause-one which states that all existing practices and
69. Tile Contractors' Ass'n of N. Cal. v. Tile Layers Local 19, 25 Lab. Arb. 9 (1955)
(Ross, Arb.).
70. Id at II.
71. By deciding that he could not decide the case, the arbitrator, in effect, upheld
management's view of the issue. The example shows why it is important for a union that
obtains a cost of living increase provision to make sure that the clause is complete.
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working conditions are to be maintained. Such a provision carries
explosive potentiality for both union and management since it em-
bodies in the agreement an unbounded promise to maintain un-
named, unspecified practices. Certain aspects of management's
mode of operation and unexpressed employee benefits may all
thereby be writ in cement. In a sizable operation, neither manage-
ment nor union can possibly have a comprehensive understanding
of what practices and working conditions exist. When parties bar-
gain in anticipation of arbitration, they should appreciate the im-
plications of negotiating a clause without boundaries.
It is true, of course, that even in the absence of such a clause
without boundaries, an arbitrator may still base his decision on
unwritten but well-established practices in the workplace.72 What
an open maintenance of working conditions clause does is simply
to cut short the arbitrator's search. Practices and v~orking condi-
tions which exist at the creation of the document-at contract
time-whether they are longstanding or not, are fixed and immu-
table.
As an alternative to a past practices clause without boundaries,
the parties might attempt, where possible, to specify certain prac-
tices in the agreement.73 Again, it may be impossible to embody
the sum and substance of existing working conditions in any docu-
ment. But nevertheless this process of particularization places on
the table a statement of what practices the parties claim exist. One
side's belief in the existence of a certain practice can be rebutted
by the other side.74 Or one side can agree to a clause without
boundaries in exchange for a desired outcome on a different mat-
ter. It is the essence of this guidepost that the bargainer evaluate
the tradeoff in full recognition that an undefined promise may
later yield unwanted fruit in arbitration.
72. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82
(1960):
Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular
industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement.
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of
the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the industry and the
shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not ex-
pressed in it.
73. See, e.g., Latrobe Die Casting Co. v. UAW Local 1984, 69 Lab. Arb. 678 (1977)
(Altrock, Arb.).
74. There are risks to this approach toward the bargaining process. There is generally
more than enough to talk about and negotiate across the bargaining table. If the parties
attempt to write the perfect agreement, they may write no agreement at all.
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F. The Nature of the Process
A final guidepost for negotiating in anticipation of arbitration
focuses on the scope and nature of the arbitration process itself.
There is no transcendent rule that an arbitrator must be given ple-
nary power. The parties may write their own ticket.75 They need
not travel "coast-to-coast," if that is not their wish. In bargaining,
the parties should decide whether they want to limit the scope of
arbitral power and, if they do, they should clearly express their
restricted grant of power.
Limitations on the scope of the arbitrator's power, which par-
ties customarily impose, appear to be of little value. For example,
there is little functional effect in limiting the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion to questions concerning the interpretation and application of
the agreement. Arbitrators invariably will find substantively arbi-
trable disputes which raise issues implied in the contract's express
provisions. Thus, the arbitrability of a subcontracting dispute, in
the absence of a clause addressed to that issue, might be based on
the presence of recognition, wage, and seniority clauses in the
agreement that the arbitrator feels may be affected by manage-
ment's contracting out.76 Moreover, the customary prohibition
that the arbitrator may not add to, subtract from, or otherwise
modify the provisions of the agreement is a bar of clay.77 The
arbitrator merely reads the contract in a manner consistent with
what he determines was the parties' intention.
78
A more successful approach to limiting the arbitrator's juris-
75. Arbitrators sometimes refer to themselves as the "creatures of the contract."
While the phrase may be unseemly, it does project a message to the parties. As long as
their process is fair to all parties concerned, including the grievant, the parties can design
the arbitration scheme as they see fit. See Abrams, The Integrity of the ArbitralProcess, 76
MICH. L. REv. 231 (1977). The public sector law of a number of states prescribes arbitra-
tion procedure. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 215.1 (Purdon 1964). Federal law
applicable to the private sector does not mandate a procedure, although it does provide
that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desir-
able method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpreta-
tion of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
76. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. UAW Local 248, 39 Lab. Arb. 1213 (1962) (Smith,
Arb.).
77. See Local 77, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 252 F.
Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (where an arbitrator interpreted a clause providing for transpor-
tation during orchestra tours as requiring travel by airplane when necessary, as the clause
had been drafted at a time when air travel was not feasible for large groups) (enforcing 46
LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 513 (1966) (Gill, Arb.)).
78. An arbitrator is not adding to an agreement when he looks to past practices as a
source for interpreting undoubtedly ambiguous contract provisions. See F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 20, at 389-411.
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diction is specifically to exclude certain matters from arbitration.
The United Auto Workers, for example, have long had in their
contracts an express exclusion of disputes concerning production
standards.79 They have decided that resolving certain industrial
disputes is too important to be left to an arbitrator. Only a clear
and specific exclusion from arbitration will suffice to defeat a
court action to compel arbitration.8" Effective bargaining to limit
the scope of arbitration, therefore, requires an express statement
of what matters lie beyond the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 81
In addition to -focusing on the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion, negotiators would do well to anticipate the procedures of ar-
bitration.8" To insure an efficient resolution of disputes, the
parties should specify how an arbitrator is to be selected, when the
hearing is to be conducted, and when the award must be issued.
Inordinate delay in rendering awards is antithetical to the goals of
a process which is said to be "speedy." 83 The parties can control
delay by specifying time limits in their arbitration provision and
by selecting only that arbitrator who will abide by their timetable
and not his own. 4
79. Any dispute concerning an increase in a production standard which has been
increased after the date of this agreement, or any dispute concerning the addition
of machines to an operation, which addition of machines does not conform to
past practice and occurs after the date of this agreement, may be referred to the
grievance procedure beginning with Step I, but shall not be subject to arbitration.
Contract between Caterpillar Tractor Co. and the United Auto Workers, (quotedin Local
751, UAW v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 534, 535 (1962) (Sembower, Arb.).
80. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85
(1960). Expressly excluding a matter from arbitration will also make unavailable an in-
junction against a strike over such a matter. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See generaly Abrams, The Labor Injunction and The Refusal to
Cross Another Union's Picket Line, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 178 (1975). In some situa-
tions, sanctioning the exercise of economic power may be too high a price to pay for an
effective exclusion.
A more limited variation of the express exclusion strategy involves the adoption by the
parties of a contract provision plainly stating that the source of rights in arbitration lies in
the express terms of the agreement and not in any prior practice unspecified in the words of
the contract. Under a contract containing the source clause, the arbitrator could still con-
sider past practices in interpreting ambiguous contract references, but he first would have
to find words in the agreement that expressly speak to the issue and require interpretation.
81. Excluding a matter from arbitration-the butcher-knife approach to limiting arbi-
tral jurisdiction-does not, of course, assure that a dispute concerning the issue will not
arise during the term of the agreement.
82. See Abrams, supra note 75.
83. Delay in the issuance of awards has long been a major problem in arbitration.
See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration
Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1115, 1140-41 (1964).
84. The American Arbitration Association requires an arbitrator to render his award
within 30 days. VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULE 37 (1975). If, however, the par-
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To promote a fair resolution of their disputes, the parties
might explore the particulars of arbitration procedure in their col-
lective agreement. Should a record be made of the arbitration
hearing by means of a tape recording?85 Should the parties spec-
ify that the arbitrator shall render a brief opinion setting forth the
reasons for his award?86 The parties might also explore the pos-
sibilities of designing an expedited arbitration system for some
matters87 and a procedurally more rigorous arbitration system for
others-for example, disputes raising race and sex discrimination
issues.88
II. CONCLUSION
Labor arbitration continues what the parties began when they
sat down at the bargaining table. Success in presenting one's posi-
tion to the arbitrator depends in large measure on success at the
bargaining table in preparing an agreement which will be the cru-
cial evidence before the arbitrator. While the other constituent
elements of success in arbitration should not be ignored-e.g.,
careful presentation of the issues, thoughtful brief writing, and se-
lection of a talented neutral-in the final analysis the words of the
contract will be determinative. The time to focus on those words
is not in preparing for arbitration but in preparing for negotiation.
It is never too late to repair an agreement. The fact that the
parties have lived under an agreement may make the tightening
up process easier: Terms have been defined by practice and that
practice can be specified in the words of the document; trouble
ties agree to arbitrate under the Association's expedited rules, the award is to be rendered
within five days. EXPEDITED LABOR ARBITRATION RULE 19 (1975). The guidelines of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service strongly urge the rendering of an award within
60 days, adding that an award rendered thereafter, while still valid, reflects "upon the per-
formance of an arbitrator with regard to his continuing relationship with the FMCS ros-
ter." 29 C.F.R. § 1404.15(a) (1977).
85. See Abrams, supra note 75, at 256-58.
86. Id at 259-60.
87. See Cohen, The Search for Innovative Procedures in Labor Arbitration, 29 ARB. J.
104 (1974).
88. The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21
(1974), stated that findings in arbitration would be apportioned greater weight in a subse-
quent title VII judicial proceeding if the court determines that there was procedural fair-
ness in the arbitral forum, an adequate record with respect to the issue of discrimination,
and that the arbitrator had a special competence in the area. To make arbitration a mean-
ingful proceeding in such cases, the parties should consider creating an arbitral system that
satisfies these factors. A proposal designed to meet these requirements has been made by
Professor Harry T. Edwards. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: 4
Proposalfor Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAB. L.J. 265 (1976).
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spots have been isolated and they can be confronted at the table;
ambiguities can be clarified; poor draftsmanship can be corrected.
The continuous process of bargaining and arbitrating repeats itself
like a M6bius strip.89
The deal struck in collective bargaining negotiations is in-
tended to last for a period of time. Care must be taken in reaching
that agreement to draft a completed document with optimum clar-
ity. The clearer the document, the less likely that grievances will
arise. If grievances do arise, a clear document will enhance reso-
lution through the grievance procedure. The clearer the docu-
ment, the more likely that the arbitrator will resolve the dispute
consistent with the parties' true bargain. The parties should work
during negotiation time to assure that their deal is interpreted and
applied at arbitration time in accordance with their intentions at
its creation. There is much they can do in anticipation of arbitra-
tion to avoid the unnecessary hard case.
89. The task of renegotiating an agreement in anticipation of arbitration may be an
endless endeavor. The collective bargaining agreement will undoubtedly always remain a
"document with broad rules, a miscellany of gaps, unclear language, and unsettled issues."
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 529 (1969).
But as the Mad Hatter said at the tea party, "Let's all move one place on." L. CARROLL,
ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 108 (1914).
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